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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
BILL OF PARTICULARS
A bill of particulars should be granted a defendant in a case
where an accused is provided an Information which does not inform
clearly of what he is charged.

CONCURRENT SENTENCES
U . C . A . 76-3-401 (4; and (5) limited the right of a sentencing
court to impose consecutive sentences where the aggregate minimum
sentences exceed twelve years.

TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

iii

NATURE OF PROCEEDING

2

RELATED APPEALS

6

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

8

ARGUMENT
Point I

BILL OF PARTICULARS

10

Point 2

CONCURRENT SENTENCES

20

CONCLUSION

26

EXHIBITS

27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED

MISTRETTA vs U.S. , 109 S. Ct . 647 (1989)

3

STATS vs BELL, 770 P.2d 100 (UTAH 1988)

15

STATE vs FLYNN, 2 99 P. 62 4 (ORE)

22

STATE vs FULTON, 742 P.2d 1208 (UTAH 1987)

16

STATS vs JONES , 748 P. 2d 839 (KANSAS 1988)

17

STATS vs KINCAID, 714 P.2d

624 (ORE 1986)

17

KOGAN vs PEOPLE, 756 P.2d 945 (COLO 1983)

17

WHALEN vs U.S. , 100 S. Ct . 1432 (1980;

21

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. 844

2

18 U.S.C. 1114

2

18 U.S.C. 924

2

18 U.S.C. Ill

3

2 6 U.S.C. 5861

3

76-5-203
76-3-401(4) (5)
77-35-4(e)

10
7, 2 0., 2 4
12

OTHER

Article I, Section 12
Utah Constitution

12

7 3 Am Jurld 302

22

.Model Penal Code

22

II I THE I JTAI I • : 0 I JRT

IE

APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

CASE NO. 89-0037-CA

vs
CATEGORY NO. 2

ADDAM SWAPP,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

BRIEF

1 'F A P P E L L A N T

JURISDICTION

1

This

is an Appeal

from, a final

Order

of C o n v i c t i o n and

Sent e n c 11 i g :I a i: e d J a, i 1i i a r > 2 6 , ,] 9 8 9 , a i i • ,:I f :i : • : :i i i 1: i I e d e i I i a I o f a M o t: ]
for

a

Bill

of

Particulars

on November

Honorable Michael R. M- : r. \
C o u r t , S umm 11, C o u n t y
2.

This

appeal

16

1 9 8 9.,

, vge o f t h e T h i r d

before

Judicial

the

District

„ : ar~. .,:: .^ah.
w a s f•i.ed

;jy an, A m e n d e d

Notice

of A p p e a l o n

over -his Appeal

b y v i r t u e of

F -=> r
.:O:J:IJ:I

U r a n C o a e A n r . o i a r e d " - 3 5 - 26 '2a; a m

4

u y , a;:^ R^t= ^ of the Rules

*- riioi appeais ;:av- been f.l-". i

Criminal Proceedings against the defendant.

1

h :-s.l: of the State

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Several appeals have been filed and yet undecided as a result
o f t i i e d e f e i i' i a n t s • : : i i i c t ] D n s :i i 1 11 i e F e d e r a )
S t a t e o f U t ah .
was

;o::v:c:^

V11 , c

D i s t: r :i : t C o i 11: t: D I t h e

I n t h e U m t ed S t a t e s Di s t r i c t C o u r t t h e d e f e n d a n t

' :\ M a r c h
• .

- -

9 , 1 9 8 8 , of c o u n t s

I

11 , 111 , I^

;. i p e r c e d :i i i g I n d i :: 11; i i e i I t

Those

:: o u i 11: s

:

..

foilows :
COUNT

I- M a l i c i o u s l y

b u i l d i n g u s e d in i n t e r s t a t e
COUNT

IT- U s i n g

commerce

a deadly

r--

;r -

^:

of
r

an e x p l o s i v e ,
c

5

and d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n

* h ^ ^ r i m<" ~ r

c '• m m ; s s ; r n ^
s(c)

damaging,,

^^

;

a

: ^ and 2 ) ;

a bomb

^:. t h e

M

C.

(1) and 2) ;
C0UNT

1 1 1 - A 1 1 empt ed m u r d e r

of o f f i c e r s

of t h e F e d e r a l

Bureau

o i: 11 i v e s 1 1 g a 1 1 o i I ( 1 3 I J, S , C . s .1 1 1 4 a: I d 2 ) ;
COUNT

IV - U s i n g a d e a d l y a n d d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n

the c o m m i s s i o n
U.S., C.

(a firearm") in

of t h e cr:i m e of v: o 1 e n c e d e s c r i k e• :i : n C o \ :,nt I 11 (
' .1 3

s. 92 4 (c) (1) and 2 ) ;

C0UNT
opposing
designated

•

fore i b 1 y

a s s a u 111 n g ,

res i s 11 n g ,

:i m p e d :i i i g ,, ::: i 1 1 :i i i 11 d a 1 1 n g , a n d

i n t e r f e r 11 i g

\ / :I :: i i p e r s D I i s

:i i :i

Kn o w i ng i y

18

U , S, C

a r, i

s. 11 i4

( en u m e r a t e d

federal

m e 1 u d l n g of f i c e r s a n d emp I oy ees of t h e B u r e a u of A1 c o h o 1
a n d F :i :t: e a r i i i s

office r s )
Tobacco

\ i1: i :i i e s a :i d :> f f i c e :i : s a i I d e i i i p i D \ e e s w e i e e i i g a g e a j i : a n d

2

on account of the performance of their official duties.
that

appellant

used

a

dangerous

and

deadly

firearm

Further,
in

the

commission of the offense (18 U.S.C. s.lll and 2 ) ;

COUNT VI - Knowingly possessing an unregistered destructive
device (a bomb) (26 U.S.C. s.5861) (d) and 18 U.S.C. s.2); and
COUNT VII - Using a deadly and dangerous weapon (a firearm)
in the commission of the crime of violence described in Count V (18
U.S.C s.924 (c) (1) and 2 ) ;
On September 12, 1988, Appellant filed Motion for a New Trial
which was denied on September 14. On September 30, 1988, the above
Court docketed the Appeal and assigned it the number 88-2516.
In February, 1989, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals issued
an Order to Show Cause why the case should not be remanded for resentencing pursuant to Mistretta vs. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647
(1989).

On March 6, 1989, the case was remanded for re-sentencmg,

and re-sentencing took place on April 20, 1989, pursuant to the
Sentencing Reforact.
his

memorandum

On January 4, 1989, the trial judge issued

opinion

of

why

certain

counts

were

deferred

(addendum).
The defendant was re-sentenced to 5 years pursuant to Count
I of the Amended Superceding Indictment ; Count II of the Amended
Superceding Indictment was deferred; Count III was stayed and the
defendant placed on probation to run concurrently with ali other
probations on other counts; Count IV the defendant was given 5
3

years imprisonment to run consecutively with Count I; Count V was
stayed and the defendant placed on probation to run concurrently
with all other probations on other counts; Count VI the defendant
was given a term of imprisonment of 5 years to run consecutively
to the terms of imprisonment in Counts I and IV; Count VII was
stayed and the defendant placed on probation to run concurrently
with all other probations on other counts.
On December 22, 1988, the jury in the above case returned a
guilty verdict against Addam Swapp and John Timothy Singer for
Manslaughter and against Jonathon Swapp for negligent homicide.
Addam Swapp and John Timothy Singer were charged with second degree
murder,

a

defendants

first
to

one

degree
to

felony,

fifteen

and

the

(1-15) years

court
in

sentenced
the Utah

the
State

Penitentiary which will run consecutively to and at the end of any
and all determinate sentences imposed in United States vs. Addam
Swapp, 88-CR-006J with the limitations that, in accordance with
Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Annotated the aggregate maximum term
of ail sentences imposed in this case and the above Federal case
shall in no event exceed thirty (30) years.

Jonathon Swapp was

sentenced to twelve (12) months in the Salt Lake County Jail to run
consecutively with his federal sentence, credit for time served was
given consistent with the sentencing Decision and Order attached
hereto as an Exhibit.
An appeal from that sentence and from a denial of defendant's
Motion for a Bill of Particulars and the denial of defendant's

4

Motion to Dismiss was timely made on January 26, 1989, and by an
Amended Notice of Appeal of February 2, 1989, to the above-entitled
Court.

5

RELATED APPEALS

Although

no

prior

appeals

have

been

made

concerning

the

defendant's State Trial there have been a number of appeals which
may be relevant to the sentencing issue of the instant appeal.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit,
that

court

has

before

it

in

NOs.

89-4090

and

89-4095

the

governments appeal based on the alleged error by the Federal Trial
Court in deferring sentencing of Addam Swapp on Count II of the
Amended Superceding Indictment.

That appeal is scheduled to be

argued in August, 1990, along with related appeals and may have
some influence on the issues in the case at bar.
defendant is including his Answer Brief.

Therefore the

The defendant may be

sentenced to an additional 5 years of consecutive imprisonment as
a result of that appeal.

6

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Did the trial court abuse it's discretion in denying a Motion
for Bill of Particulars when theories charged in the Information
are non-specific as to the actus reas of the Defendant.
May a Defendant be sentenced to concurrent, as distinguished
from

consecutive

sentences, in

State

Court

where

he has

been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment which would exceed Utah Code
Annotated 76-3-401 (4).
Should

a Defendant

be

sentenced

to

consecutive

terms

of

imprisonment for a charge which arose out of, and is an integral
part of the same criminal episode.

7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Circumstances

leading

to

the

facts

which

have

proceeded

charges of the defendant in this case are well known in this state.
They begin with the January 1979, death of John Singer by a law
enforcement officer in Marion, Utah.
Singer was subject

The life and death of John

to wide publicity

educate his children

outside

concerning

of the public

his desire to

school

system, his

beliefs concerning polygamy, government, and his insistence upon
religious freedom and his right to privacy.
A few years after John Singer's death Addam Swapp and his
brother Jonathan moved onto the Singer farm and Addam married two
of John Singers' daughter.

Shortly, thereafter, there ensued a

series

with

of

minor

religious leaders.

conflicts

the

immediate

neighbors

On January 16, 1988, at 3:00 a.m., Addam Swapp

detonated a bomb in the LDS Stake Center in Marion, Utah.
the next

and

thirteen days Addam and

Jonathan

During

Swapp, John Timothy

Singer, Addams' wives, Vickie Singer, and related children, were
surrounded by up to two hundred law enforcement personnel together
with various aspects of the news media.
During the siege there were arc lights directed at the house
and there were attempts to shoot out the lights.

There were sirens

and speakers directing noise towards the farmhouse and there were
attempts to shoot out those speakers or to otnerwise
physically disable them, (Partial TR. P. 21-28), and there were as

8

many as one hundred rounds fired during the thirteen days towards
the lights and speakers, (Partial TR. P. 69). There were various
other

incidents

of

confrontation

between

the

defendant,

his

brother, and law enforcement, during the thirteen days, (Partial
TR. P. 24, 25, 85, 87). On the last day of the siege, January 28,
1988, law enforcement officers attempted to capture Addam Swapp
which attempt erupted into gunfire, which, ultimately resulted in
the death of Officer Fred House.
The defendant, Addam Swapp, was charged with Murder in the
second degree as follows:
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the second degree, a first degree
felony, in Summit County, Utah, on or about January 28, 1988, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203 (a), (b), and/or (c),
and Title 76, Chapter 2, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that the defendants, Addam W. Swapp, Jonathan R. Swapp,
and John Timothy Singer, as parties to the offense, intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of Fred House; and/or intending to
cause serious bodily injury to another, said defendants committed
an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of
Fred House; and/or acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, said defendants knowingly engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby
caused the death of Fred House.
On or about November 16, 1989, the defendants Motion for Bill
Particulars

was

denied,

and

the

defendants

Manslaughter and sentenced as aforesaid.

9

were

convicted

of

ARGUMENT

BILL OF PARTICULARS

The prosecution elected to charge the defendants in the alternative
with three separate possible theories of murder concerning most of
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203.

They charged that the defendants as

parties to the offense
(a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Fred House
and/or
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the
defendant committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
caused the death of Fred House and/or
(c) acting

under

circumstances

evidencing

a depraved

in-

difference to human life, the defendant engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the
death of Fred House.
The defendant was charged with completing one or all of the
above "on or about January 28, 1988 M .
If we assume that by charging "on or about January 28, 1983"
the State was thereby not

limited

in its proof

to the day of

January 28, 1988, we have then a thirteen day period being used as
proof of a homicide.

That the State did in fact intend to rely on

such proof is evidenced by their probable cause statement filed
10

with the Information

(Record at R.0249) and the conduct of the

trial where all the known events of the thirteen day period prior
to January 28, 1988 were explored in the State's case in chief.
In the

written

response

to

defendant's

Motion

for

a Bill

of

Particulars the State referred to the Probable Cause Affidavit as
facts supplied by the defendant to obviate his need for a Bill of
Particulars (Record at R.0006).
Therefore

we

have

presented

a

thirteen

day

period

with

hundreds of discreet facts, ail of which may or may not be used as
proof of the elements of any one of the three theories of the crime
alleged.

If we take this situation together with the fact that the

defendant was charged along with Jonathan Swapp and John Timothy
Singer as parties to the offense we have a complex problem for the
defense.
The prosecution is able to choose which of the hundreds of
facts of the thirteen day siege it will use to prosecute one or ail
of

the three

theories

it may

choose

and which

combination

defendants preformed which acts of whichever theory.

of

Without a

Bill of Particulars the prosecution may excercise its discretion
as to which theories, which facts and which parties and in what
combination(s),

up

to

the

point

of

resting

its

case-in-chief

without ever disclosing these to the defense.
The

foregoing

is

the

situation

untenable, unfair, and unlawful.
11

the

defendant

claims

is

It is unfair because the defense

is hampered in anticipating whether or not it must be prepared to
rebut all three theories of murder and which facts will be used for
which theory with which combination of defendants.

The defendant

must then be prepared on ail three theories and with ail possible
facts of the thirteen day siege and with all possible combinations
of the three defendants even though the prosecution may have one
theory, a limited number of facts and a specific combination of
defendants as applied to the theory and to the limited number of
facts.

The burden on the defense is that will be arguably less

prepared

because

its

efforts

will

be

spent

on preparation

of

matters which may never be tried, or the defedant is required to
guess at which facts support which theories and which combination
of factors and by guessing,, be at his peril.

u.C.A. 77-35-4(e) contemplates that a Bill of Particulars may be
used to assist the defendant in his defense:
When facts not set out in an information or indictment are
required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense,
the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of
particulars.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees, "In
criminal

prosecutions

the accused

shall

have the right

to

demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him [and] to
have a copy thereof.ff

There are other purposes to a Bill of

12

Particulars but at least U.C.A. 77-35-4(e)(Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure 4[e]) and the Utah Constitution announce that the accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the offense.
for a Bill of Particulars may be used for this purpose.

A motion
State vs.

Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987).
If it is granted that the accused is entitled to know the
nature and cause of the offense, did the Information in the case
at bar so inform the defendant as to allow the opporitunity to
prepare and present his defense?
The Information
murdered the victim.

charges three ways the defendant may have
The Information does not recite which way the

defendant murdered him but that at least one of the methods was
used.

However, more importantly, the Information by the use of

"and/or" charges that the defendant may have committed the crime
by any combination of the three theories.
he

prepares

his

defense

must

Any defendant then as

anticipate,

without

a

3ill

of

Particulars, which of the nine combinations of the theories in the
Information he must challenge.

However, that is not the problem

that perplexes the defendant most.
The prosecution did not contend at trial or at preliminary
hearing that defendant (Addam Swapp) fired any shot on the day ef
the death of Fred House (Dec. 19, 1988 transcript p. 24 & 25). The
prosecution has never maintained that the defendant asked any other
person to fire at Fred House. (Dec. 19, 1988 transcript p.24 & 25).
How then, by what means, did the defendant murder Fred House?

13

The

closest

the

defendant

ever

came

to

learning

the

prosecution1s theory came at closing (transcript of Dec. 19, 1988
at p. 24).
The State's theory is that Addam Swapp set in motion events
which naturally and foreseeably led to the death of Officer
House and that he encouraged others by his behavior by his
leadership role, that I think despite his protestations
about it, is clear. That he was the leader up there
and that other were acting in concert with him in resisting
law enforcement officers. And the case really boils
down to this, and that is, for a perceived injustice
Addam Swapp blew up a church in an act of vengeance, and
then held at bay law enforcement officers for some fifteen
days .
At oral arguement in response to defendant's Motion for Bill
of Particulars the State responded (transcript Nov. 16, 18, & 25
at page 79)
Mr Horton: Your Honor, in this particular case I don't
know what more the State could do in terms of a bill of
particulars. The State has laid out an extensive probable
cause statement. Mr. Bucher has been through not only a
preliminary hearing in this matter, but he had an
opportunity to review a memorandum that the State has filed
regarding the theories of liability.
Not only that, also two memoranda filed regarding 404B and
the use of other prior bad acts.
I think that he can't,
at this point, claim that he doesn't understand what theory
is or what the State's evidence is.
and at page 80 supra
The second degree homicide theories are separable and one
is intentionally or knowingly, one is intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another, and one is the deprived
indifference theory. And I think that it's no surprise to
Mr. Bucher that we are taking an approach that in order to
put Addam Swapp's criminal liability into proper
perspective you cannot simply take morning of January 28.
You have to take into account the fact that he bombed the
church, that he thereafter refused to negotiate in any
manner with the law enforcement people,
notwithstanding personal visits from intermediaries, and
notwithstanding a letter from the governor.

14

Notwithstanding any other entreaties that may have been
made and that situation was highly fraught with danger to
all concerned. And in light of that, he continued and
pursued this course of lawful activity, which very
foreseeably resulted in someone being killed on the
morning of January 28. I don't believe that there can be
any confusion about the State's theory or what will be
presented. It's fully been set out in our pleadings and
inventory of reports which Mr. Bucher has been aware of
for months and months. It's also clearly set out in a
probable cause statement, and in our various memos
regarding liability.
The problem with all of the pretrail arguments by the State
in opposition to the Bill of Particulars is that they do not meet
the point.
The

prosecution

disclosed

its

three

theories

and

the

prosecution disclosed the facts of what the defendants did during
the thirteen day seige but they refused to disclose which of the
facts upon which they would rely to prove which theory.

That is,

if there are a great number of facts, any number of which may be
used to prove three alternative theories of how something was done,
is not the accused allowed to know how it was that they claim he
did the "something" of which he is charged.

Merely making all data

available does not inform the accused of what data is claimed to
show culpabilty.
In State vs . Bel 1 , 770 P. 2d 100 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court
was faced with an Information which followed the statutory language
and made reference

to a ten month period wherein

racketeering was committed.

the crime of

In response to the defendant's Motion

for a Bill of Particulars the State supplied a generalized
15

statement of facts which would be used to establish the crime.
In the present case, the Information charges the language of
the statute and the State's response to the request for particulars
was not even as generous as in Bell supra; the State in this case
merely

exhibited

the

probable

cause

statement

and

said

the

defendant should know from that and from his previous trial of what
he is charged.
of papers

Again, this is spurious because in no paper or set

is it declared

by what means, specific

or general,

defendant Addam Swapp murdered Fred House.
As the Court in Bell stated at p.107:
Also, we think it important to clarify that we reject the
implication of the State's argument: that the State,
having failed to provide even a minimally adequate bill of
particulars despite persistent requests from Bell, can
excuse that failure under the guise of harmless error by
claiming that Bell had pretrial access to a mass of various
items of information from which, one can conclude in
hindsight, Bell could have gleaned the State's theories for
the essential elements of the crimes charged. For this
Court to accept such an argument would not only vitiate the
specific requirements of rule 4(e), it would negate the
accused's constitutional right, implemented by rule 4(e),
to "have a copy" of a document setting out in clear terms
"the nature and cause of the accusation."
The Bel 1 Court quoted State vs.Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah
1987) with approval that even if the Information is pled correctly
the defendant is still entitled to a plain and concise statement
of what he is charged.
the government

could

Simply pointing to facts and theories that
use

to

establish

a

crime

should

not

be

adaquet.
When a charging paper accuses in such a way whereby it is not
obvious as to what the accused did to violate the statute a
16

specific Bill should be granted. State vs. Jones , 748 P.2d
(Kansas 1988); Kogan vs. People, 756 P.2d

945 (Colorado

State vs. Kmcaid, 730 Or. App 23, 714 P.2d 624 (

839

1988);

1935).

The defendant believes he has the general constitutional right to
know clearly and concisely of what he is charged and he believes
he has a more specific right depending on the facts surrounding his
invoiement with the crime and how the prosecution chooses to charge
the crime.
The latter right is addressed

in Bell

and Fulton supra in

those parts of the holding which contain the discussions of the
specific charges.

The right is just not dependant on whether or

not the prosecution chooses to charge in the alternative but on
whether the character of the defendant's act is concretely

and

specifically enunciated.
For example, if an actor were to enter a bank and point a
firearm at a teller and demand money the prosecution may (subject
to other concerns) elect to charge him in the alternative with one
or a combination of crimes, but what the actor is alleged to have
actually and physically done to commit whatever the prosecution
charges may be set out and alleged in a short sentence.
defendant would likely as not

Such a

ever ask for a Bill of Particulars

even if a description of his act were deleted from the charging
papers.
As that simple hypothetical becomes more complex so does the
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right

to have

a Bill

of

Particulars

become

clearer.

If the

prosecution chooses they can charge alternate ways an actor may be
culpable of several crimes or alternate ways he can be guilty of
one crime but those acts of omissions that it is claimed he did to
subject himself to the theories of criminal behavior must be set
out.
In Addam

Swapp's

case, during

the

thirteen

day

siege

he

performed many acts which made him liable for several crimes and
many acts which were neutral and noncriminal and may be alleged to
be criminal but are, in isolation, neutral.
For example Addam Swapp shot at speakers and lights.
subjected him to two or three federal
crimes.

That

crimes and perhaps state

Did that same activity constitute acts which the State

alleges are evidences of one of the theories of murder?
Addam Swapp also did those commonplace activities of which
would be natural in the circumstances.

He barricaded and enclosed

his family, he went for water, goat's milk, and wood, he ate, he
prayed, he saw to the personal hygiene of himself and his family
{Dec.

14, 1988 Transcript pp. 150-194).

Those acts could oe used

as elements of one of the three theories of the prosecution.
However,

there

could

be

countless

other

acts

which

the

prosecution intends to allege that were not committed at ail or
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that someone else committed.

Of those kinds of acts., not only does

the defendant not know what they are but does not know how they are
going to be connected by the prosecution into one or ail of the
three murder theories. Whether or not an Information charges with
enough particularity must be subject to a case by case approach.
A defendant could be charged as Addam Swapp has been and simply
furnishing discovery would obviate a Bill of Particulars in a case
where it were clear what the defendant did to cause death, or to
create a grave risk of death.
The problem is exacerbated by the "and/or" method of pleading
the theories of murder.

Is Addam

Swapp to assume that he is

charged with acting in concert with his co-defendants, that the
three of them ail did those acts necessary to prove U.C.A. 76-5203 (a) and (b) and (c) ?

Or is he to assume that one or more of

the co-defendants did some of the acts necessary to prove (a) but
not (b) or (c) or is he to assume that one or more of the codefendants did some of the acts of (a), (b), and (c) and he did the
other acts.

Which acts is he to assume that he is charged and

which acts are his co-defendants and which co-defendant and which
theory?

If he knew which acts went where he could negate his Mens

rea as to those acts or he could rebut that the acts were committed
by any co-defendant or that the acts do not add up to the corpus
of the crime.
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CONCURRENT SENTENCES

Utah Code Annotated 75-3-401 (4) and (5) read at' the time of
the sentencing of the defendant as follows:

(4)

If a court lawfully determined to impose consecutive
sentences, the aggregate minimum of ail sentences imposed
may not exceed twelve years' imprisonment and the aggregate
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed thirty
years' imprisonment. however, this limitation does not
apply if an offense for which defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or life imprisonment.
The limitation in subsection (4) applies:

5)

(a) If a defendant is sentenced at the same time for more
than one offense;
(b) If a defendant is sentenced at different times for
one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior
to imposition of sentence for any one or more of them;
(c) If a defendant has already been sentenced by a court
of this state other than the present sentencing court or
by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction.

The

Stace

trial

court

sentenced

the defendant

to

one

to

fifteen years in tne Utah State Prison to run consecutively to any
other

federal

sentence

imposed

with

the

condition

that

ail

sentences could not exceed thirty years (see Sentencing Decision
ana Order attached hereto as an Exhibit).
The defendant was re-sentenced to a fifteen year sentence on
April 20, 1989 by the Honorable Bruce Jenkins, Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for Utah.

That sentence was appealed

by the United States on the grounds that an additional five year
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sentence could not be "deferred" as to Count VII of the Federal
Amended

Superceding

Indictment.

Consequently,

the

defendant

received a fifteen year federal sentence with the possibility of
an additional five years.
The defendant

objects

to the State Court

sentence

on the

grounds that it violates Utah Code Annotated 76-3-401 (4) and (5).
The plain reading of the statute is that the aggregate minimum of
all sentences shall not exceed twelve years and this is invoked if
the defendant has already been sentenced by a court of federal
jurisdiction.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to a maximum of thirty
years

for

ail

sentences.

(see

Sentencing

order

as

an

Exhibit

herein)

Thusly, the trial court followed that part of the statute

dealing

with

a maximum

term but

failed

to employ

the minimum

sentence term of the statute.
There seems little doubt that the general rule regarding the
interpretation of penal statutes is that they are to be construed
strictly and if there exists ambiguity or vagueness, the statute
should be construed in favor of the accused.

Wha1 en vs U.S., 63

L. Ed.2d 715, 100 S. Ct. 1432 (1980); 73 Am Jor.2d 295.
The defendant however does not insist that the statute is
ambiguous.

The plain reading of it is not a consecutive sentence

is impermissible if what is created

is a sentence in excess of a

twelve year minimum.

It is urged that this is the only permissible

conclusion when the doctrine of plain or literal construction is
applied. 73 Am Jur. 2d 302.
It is also clear that sections (4) and (5) of U.C.A. 76-3-401
should be read together as they are in pari materia in that they
relate to the same subject matter.

State vs Flynn, 137 Or. 8, 299

P. 694.
Section 7.06 of the Model Penal Code reads in pertinent part
as foilows:
(i) Sentences of Imprisonment for More Than One Crime.
When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed en a
defendant for more than one crime, including a crime for
which a previous suspended sentence of probation has been
revoked, such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or
consecutively as the Court determines at the time of
sentence, except that:
(a) a definite and an indefinite term shall run
concurrently and both sentences shall be satisfied by
service of the indefinite term; and
(b) the aggregate of consecutive definite terms shall
not exceed one year; and
(c) the aggregate of consecutive indefinite terms
shall not exceed in minimum or maximum length the
longest extended term authorized for the highest grade
and degree of crime for which any of the sentences was
imposed; and
(d) not more than one sentence for an extended term
shall be imposed.
The explanatory Notes and Commentaries refer to the general
considerations given to the promulgation of Section 7.06.
The explanatory note reads:
Section 7.06

deals generally with many facets

o

of multiple sentences for different
offenses.
It
reflects
two
basic
principles: that the choice between
consecutive and concurrent sentences is
one that should be left to the court,
and that a reasonable limit should be
set on the extent to which multiple
sentences can be cumulated.
Subsection
(i)
implements
these
principles by proving, in the case of
multiple felony convictions, that the
extended term for the most serious
offense for which the defendant is to be
sentenced is the longest term to which
he can be sentenced, but that sentences
can be cumulated within that limitation.
The premises that the extended term
limit, designed
for
the persistent
offender, the professional criminal and
the
dangerous,
mentally
abnormal
offender, is also an appropriate gauge
for the multiple offender.
Subsection
(1) also provides that a definite and an
indefinite term shall run concurrently,
with the sentences satisfied by service
of the indefinite term.
It also
restricts the aggregate of consecutive
definite sentences to a period of one
year, which was- viewed as the outside
limitation on any sentence to a local
facility
that
does
not
provide a
meaningful
correctional
program
and
parole opportunities.
Subsection (2) is grounded on the
principle that the timing of trials or
the number of trials for different
offenses
should
not
affect
the
limitations established by Subsection
(1). Thus, if a defendant has committed
two offenses, the sentencing limitations
established by this section will apply
if he is tried separately for the two
crimes as well as if he is tried for
both
offenses
at
the
same
time.
Subsection (2) also sets forth other
principles to control the situation in
which the defendant is being sentenced
for an offense that was committed prior
to
the
imposition
of
another
sentence ....
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Subsection (5) provides the rules by
which multiple sentences of imprisonment
shall be calculated.
In effect the
defendant is to be viewed as though he
were serving one sentence. In the case
of concurrent sentences, his term is
fixed by the longest minimum term and
the longest maximum term to which he is
subject
In the case of consecutive
sentences,
the
minimum
terms
are
aggregated and the maximum terms are
aggregated, thus producing a single term
which is measured by the limits. When
definite
and
indefinite
terms
run
consecutively, the definite term is
added to both the minimum and the
maximum of the indefinite term.
The Model

Penal

Code

then attempts

to allow

a sentencing

court to impose consecutive sentences but to place a ceiling on
those sentences for the obvious reason that different courts often
have different

concerns and sentences may accumulated

simply unfair.

that are

In the instant case the federal sentencing court

had to effectuate those policies embodied in the Sentencing Reform
Act and related statutes, that is, a fifteen year mandatory term
of imprisonment.

The State Sentencing Court had those concerns

stated in its Sentencing Order.

Those concerns and policies do not

necessarily have the ultimate limit of consecutive sentences of a
particular defendant m
as U.C.A. 76-3-401.

mind.

That is the reason for statutes such

In its Summary Decision (attached hereto as an Exhibit) the
trial court took the view that Section 76-3-401 is not applicable
if the first sentence was of a "determinate" nature.
does not state that but
includes

federal

rather

sentences.

in subsection

The

defendant

The statute

(5) specifically

urges

that

if

the

statute were written to address a "determinate" issue it would have
done so and it would have hopefully defined what a "determinate
sentence" means.

We can only assume the legislature intended to

speak to the speak to the effect of a federal sentence and not to
a "determinate" one because they chose not to discuss determinate
sentences but to discuss federal ones. We may only assume that the
legislature chose not to act when they are silent and that they
chose to act when they speak
It should be noted that the defendant Addam Swapp was tried
and sentenced on the same behaviors and the same acts for which he
was

tried

and

sentenced

in

the

federal

court.

The

statutes

changed, the jurisdiction changed but his acts or ommissions were
identical .

CONCLUSION

The defendant believes he was denied the constitutional and
statutory right to a clear statement of the

charges against: him

by the denial of his Motion of Bill of Particulars and thai, a new
trial should be afforded him with directions that the Information
is not sufficient under the circumstances to inform him of what he
stands accused.
The defendant believes that the sentence of the State trial
court should be vacted because it is unlawful under the statute and
unfair.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

SUMMARY DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

1218

vs.
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP,
Defendants.

The court took under advisement and requested briefs on the
issue of the courtfs discretion under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah
Code Ann., to apply consecutive sentences.
Upon consideration of the briefs submitted, the court hereby
rules

that

the

prohibition

of

aggregate

minimum

sentences

exceeding 12 years in Section 76-3-401(4) is not applicable when
the sentence of the first sentencing
sentence.

court

is a determinate

See People v. Dye. 69 111.2d 298, 371 N.E.2d 630, 633-

34 (1977).
The

sentences

determinate
federal

of

each

defendant

in

Federal

Court

were

sentences and were not rendered otherwise by the

statute

allowing

good

time.

The

sentences

to

be

considered under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code Ann., are those
actually imposed by the first sentencing court and not the range
of terms which the first sentencing court has as alternatives
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prior to imposition of a determinate sentence.
these sentences are not to be considered

Consequently,

in determining the

aggregate minimum sentences under Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code
Ann.
While the court is of the view that a proper consideration
of the federal sentencing scheme resolves the issue concerning
aggregate minimums, further comment and construction of Section
76-3-401(4) is appropriate.
In determining whether consecutive sentences may and should
be imposed, a court is governed by Subsections 76-3-401(1)-(3),
which

set

consecutive

forth

the

authority

sentences.

and

factors

for

imposing

The first phrase of Subsection 76-3-

401(4) expressly indicates that it is invoked only if the court
has

already

sentences."

"lawfully

determined

to

impose

consecutive

The succeeding language concerning limitations on

aggregate minimums and aggregate maximums, then, does not limit
the courtfs

discretion

in

imposing

consecutive

merely dictates the effect of such sentences.
the

federal

sentences

sentences but

For example, if

in this case had to be considered

in

calculating aggregate minimums under Subsection 76-3-401(4), one
alternative effect of a consecutive 1 to 15 year state sentence
could be that it would begin to run concurrent with the federal
sentence after the eleventh year.
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While the court need not address such issues in this case,
it is clear that Subsection 76-3-401(4) addresses the effect of
consecutive sentences and does not prohibit consecutive sentences
when

the

imposition

aggregate

minimum

of a consecutive

is

exceeded

sentence.

by

This

reason

of

construction

the
of

Subsection 76-3-401(4) is consistent with the directions to the
Board of Pardons in Subsection 76-3-401(6) in "determining the
effect of consecutive sentences."

(Emphasis added).

If any of the defendants view the construction of Subsection
76-3-401(4) in this Summary Decision to be erroneous and its
effect is the imposition of an unlawful sentence, their remedy is
a direct appeal at this time.

Absent a contrary construction of

the statute by subsequent binding precedent, the doctrine of res
judicata and the law of the case will require any other judge of
this court to deny a request to correct any of the sentences
under Section 77-35-22(e), Utah Code Ann., whether presented by
the Board of Pardons, a motion by a defendant in this case or
collateral attack.

Furthermore, if not challenged now by direct

appeal, it is arguable that a challenge hereafter under Section
77-35-22(e) has been waived.
Dated this

26th

day of January, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Attorney for Jonathan R. Swapp
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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to the following,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SENTENCING DECISION
AND ORDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

1218

vs.
ADDAM W. SWAPP, JOHN TIMOTHY
SINGER, and JONATHAN SWAPP,
Defendants.
This matter is before the court for imposition of sentences
on Addam W. Swapp, Timothy Singer and Jonathan Swapp.
On December
against Addam

22, 1988 the jury

Swapp

and Timothy

returned

Singer

guilty

verdicts

for Manslaughter

and

against Jonathan Swapp for Negligent Homicide.
The general

circumstances

surrounding

this case and the

death of State Corrections Officer Fred House are well and widely
known.

The defendants claim that the pertinent circumstances

date back to January, 1979 when John Singer was shot by a State
law enforcement officer during an arrest attempt.

John Singer

had gained notoriety for his religious fundamentalism, practice
of polygamy and refusal to comply with court orders concerning
the education of his children at home.
Singerfs

death,

Addam

Swapp

befriended

Sometime after John
John

Singer's

widow,

Vickie Singer, and her children who included defendant Timothy
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Thereafter, Addam Swapp moved onto the Singer farm,

married two of John and Vickie Singer's daughters and adopted at
least some of the religious beliefs and practices of John Singer.
In 1987 defendant Jonathan Swapp began working on a construction
project with his brother Addam and resided at the Singer farm.
Throughout this period there were conflicts with neighbors
concerning water and other property rights.

The most significant

events, however, surrounded a lawsuit which Vickie Singer and her
family

filed

various

Utah

in Federal
public

District

officials

Court

and

law

arising from the death of John Singer.

seeking

damages

enforcement

from

officers

Vickie Singer hired a

noted trial lawyer to pursue her family's claims, the matter
proceeded through discovery and was eventually dismissed.

The

dismissal pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., was premised on the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact which would give
rise to any potential recovery or even the right to have the
matter submitted to a jury.
188

(Utah 1982).

United

States

See, Singer v. Wadman, 595 F.Supp.

The dismissal was upheld on appeal and the

Supreme

Court

declined

to review.

Singer v.

Wadman, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S.
1028 (1985).
On January 16, 1988, acting upon a purported revelation from
God

and

in order to focus attention on perceived

injustices

visited upon the Singer family, Addam Swapp detonated a bomb in a
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Marion,

Utah

church

building,

a Stake

Center

of the Mormon

Church.

Addam Swapp then retreated to the Singer farm in Marion

and, along with the other two defendants, engaged in an armed
resistance

to his arrest.

For a period

of

13 days, these

defendants held at bay law enforcement personnel from the Federal
Bureau

of

Investigation,

the

Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco

Firearms, and various Utah law enforcement

agencies.

and

It was

believed by some in the Singer and Swapp household, including
defendants Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer, that John Singer would
return from the dead and resolve the standoff.
In

the

enforcement

early
officers

morning

hours

executed

of

a plan

January
to

28,

1988,

law

apprehend

Addam

and

Jonathan Swapp while they were outside the main building on the
Singer farm.

An exchange of gunfire ensued during the arrest

attempt and Fred House, a Utah Department of Corrections Officer,
was shot and killed while releasing trained dogs to subdue the
two defendants.

The evidence leaves little doubt that the shots

which felled Officer House came from the Singer house and were
fired by Timothy Singer.
The defendants, along with Vickie Singer, were tried first
in United States District Court for the District of Utah on an
indictment alleging various federal criminal violations.

Each of

these defendants were convicted of various charges and sentenced.
The killing of Officer House was not a part or element of the
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federal charges or convictions. Addam Swapp was sentenced to
three consecutive five year terms.

Timothy Singer and Jonathan

Swapp were each sentenced to two consecutive five year terms.

In

sentencing the defendants, the Court did not apply the federal
sentencing guidelines as required by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.

As a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in

United States v. Mistretta. No. 87-1904 (January 18, 1989), the
Federal Court may be required to resentence the defendants.

Such

resentencing, however, need not deter this court from imposing
its sentence at this time for the state convictions.
The State of Utah then pursued murder charges against these
defendants and the matter was tried before a jury.

As indicated,

the facts which this court has been able to recite above in a
mere five paragraphs were well and widely known.

Such facts,

however,

evidentiary

pale

in

comparison

to

the

extensive

presentation to the jury which consumed
days.

almost 14 full trial

It is upon this extensive evidence, and not upon the well

and widely known generalities, that the jury based its verdicts.
The

jury

selection

process

assured

the

State

and

the

defendants that a fair and impartial jury would hear the detailed
evidence surrounding Officer House's death.

The venire panel

from which the eight deliberating jurors were seated was composed
of over 200 adult citizens of Summit County.

The selection
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process consumed approximately three and one-half court days.
The result was a jury panel of eight and two alternates who
dispassionately

considered

all of the extensive and detailed

evidence from the perspective of neutrality and the presumption
of innocence, not the perspective of persons knowing only some of
the facts, not from the perspective of those who had disputes
with the Singer and Swapp families, not from the perspective of
sympathizers of the defendants, and not from the perspective of
Officer House's family.
The verdicts which the jury returned after more than three
days of deliberations are deserving of respect by all and any
derision directed at the verdicts reflects a lack of respect for
law and order, which is exactly the attitude of those who brought
about the death of Officer House.

The selection, composition,

efforts and verdicts of this Summit County jury have purged any
perceived cause for embarrassment to Summit County and the State
of Utah arising from the events surrounding the Singer and Swapp
families.
The State

originally

charged

Degree Murder, a first degree felony.

each defendant with Second
The jury found each of the

defendants not guilty of these charges.

These verdicts of not

guilty reflect the factual determination of the jury that none of
the defendants intentionally or knowingly caused the death of
Fred House; that none of these defendants intended to cause
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bodily

injury

to

anyone;

and,

that

none

of

these

defendants acted with a depraved indifference to human life.

The

court assumes that in making this determination the jury could
well have found from the conflicting evidence that Addam Swapp
did not shoulder his weapon, that Timothy Singer was firing at
the trained dogs, and that Jonathan Swapp was not aiming at any
person when he fired his weapon.
In returning guilty verdicts against defendants Addam Swapp
and

Timothy

Singer

for

the

lesser-included

offense

of

Manslaughter, the jury determined that these two caused the death
of Officer House and they did
following

circumstances:

so under one or more of the

recklessly;

under the

influence of

extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse; or under a reasonable belief that their
acts were

legally

justification

justified

or excused

or excuse existed.

even

though

no such

The guilty verdict against

defendant Jonathan Swapp reflected a jury finding that he caused
the death of Fred House while acting with criminal negligence. It
is from these factual predicates that the court proceeds in the
exercise of its duty to impose sentence on each defendant.
Having

previously

sentences' consecutive
significant

remaining

ruled
to

the

that

this

federal

sentencing

court

may

sentences,

issues

concern

run
the

its
most

whether

consecutive sentences should be imposed and defendants Addam
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Timothy

Singer's

requests

to

be

sentenced

for

offenses lower in degree than the second degree felony for which
each was convicted.

The court is of the view that essentially

the same considerations are applicable to both issues.
Section 76-3-401(2), Utah Code Ann., specifies the factors
for this court to consider in determining whether its sentences
should run consecutively.

The factors are these:

the gravity

and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character and
rehabilitative needs of the defendants.

To a certain extent in

the application of these factors there is some commonality among
the defendants.
While the evidence before this court isolated Addam Swapp as
the generator of the circumstances giving rise to the siege, each
of the defendants knowingly and voluntarily participated in the
standoff.

By finding each defendant not guilty of Second Degree

Murder, the jury has already given the defendants full benefit of
its factual determination that they did not intend to kill or
harm anyone.

The death of Officer House, however, is irrefutable

evidence

the grave

of

risk of injury and death created and

furthered by these defendants.

Defendants1 armed resistance to

lawful warrants is a far cry from nonviolent civil disobedience
and passive resistance.

Thoreau, Gandhi and Martin Luther King

practiced nonviolent civil disobedience and passive resistance in
protesting alleged unfair laws, regulations and practices.

They
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did not, however, engage in armed conflict and were willing to
accept the legal consequences of their conduct.

These defendants

bore arms in support of their views and to avoid the consequences
of Addam Swappfs conduct.

In doing so, the jury found that they

caused the death of Officer House.
In

addition

to

the

gravity

and

circumstances

of

the

offenses, the risk these defendants continue to pose to society
is another common

factor.

Each defendant has expressed his

remorse for the death of Officer House.

Such remorse, however,

is of little significance in light of each defendant's failure to
express remorse for the creation of the dangerous circumstances
causing Officer House's death.

Defendants' failure to accept

responsibility for the consequences of their acts places society
at continued risk.

These defendants acted as anarchists and this

court has been presented with no credible information that, if
given the opportunity, they would not again engage in anarchism
and armed conflict.
The court

has carefully

considered

each

of the

factors

presented by each of the individual defendants in support of
running

this

sentences.

court's

sentences

concurrent

with

the

federal

Suffice it to say that such factors do not overcome

the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the continuing
risk to society.

To run this court's sentences concurrent with

the federal sentences would require this court to disregard the

STATE V. SWAPP

SENTENCING DECISION

PAGE NINE

death of Officer House.

The death of Officer House was not a

consideration or an element

in the federal prosecution.

His

death, however, was the sine qua non of the state prosecutions.
This court acknowledges that at some time in the future one
or more of the defendants may no longer pose a risk to society.
The indeterminate sentencing scheme of the State of Utah will
allow defendants Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer the opportunity
to persuade the Board of Pardons that confinement for the maximum
State term will not be necessary.

They will be given that

opportunity following the completion of their federal confinement
and after they begin to serve their consecutive State terms.
Jonathan Swapp will be given a similar opportunity by requesting
this court to review its sentence upon completion of his federal
sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion of
Addam Swapp and the request of Timothy Singer to be sentenced for
a crime lower in degree than that for which they were convicted
and orders imposition of the following sentences:
Addam Swapp shall serve a term of 1 to 15 years in
the

Utah

State

consecutively

to

Penitentiary

which

and

end

at

the

term
of

any

will

run

and

all

determinate sentences imposed in United States v. Addam
Swapp, No. 88-CR-006J with the limitation, however,
that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4), Utah Code

STATE V. SWAPP

Ann.,

SENTENCING DECISION

PAGE TEN

the

aggregate

maximum

term

of

all

sentences

imposed in this case and the above-referenced federal
case shall in no event exceed thirty (30) years.
Timothy Singer shall serve a term of 1 to 15 years
in the Utah State Penitentiary which term will run
consecutively
determinate

to

and

at

sentences

the

imposed

Timothy Singer, No. 88-CR-006J

end
in

of

any

United

and

all

States

v,

with the limitation,

however, that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4),
Utah

Code Ann.,

the

aggregate maximum

term

of all

sentences imposed in this case and the above-referenced
federal

case

shall

in no event

exceed

thirty

(30)

years.
Jonathan Swapp shall serve a term of 12 months in
the

Salt

Lake

consecutively
determinate

to

County
and

sentences

Jail,
at

the

imposed

which
end
in

terra
of

will

run

and

all

States

v.

any

United

Jonathan Swapp, No. 88-CR-006J, with the limitation,
however, that, in accordance with Section 76-3-401(4),
Utah

Code Ann., the

aggregate maximum

term

of all

sentences imposed in this case and the above-referenced
federal
years.

case

shall

in no event

exceed

thirty

(30)
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Each of the defendants will be given credit for time served
since the execution of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum
to the extent credit therefor is not applied to the federal
sentences.

The determination of the amount of credit due, if

any, to Addam Swapp and Timothy Singer shall be made by the Board
of Pardons consistent with this Sentencing Decision,
Defendant Addam Swapp's Motion for Abatement and Continuance
of Sentencing is denied.
Dated this

26th

day of January, 1989.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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to the following,

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
88-CR-0006J
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADDAM SWAPP,
VICKIE L. SINGER,
JONATHAN R. SWAPP, and
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

At the time sentences were pronounced in this case, the
court reserved the right to write on questions of sentencing, and
to set forth his reasons in amplified form for imposing sentence
as to certain counts, and for deferring the imposition of sentence
on Count II.
Two of the defendants, Addam Swapp, and Vickie Singer,
were charged and convicted of the below described offenses, among
others.

Such offenses were charged as Counts I and II in the

Superseded Indictment, as modified.

(The counts were originally

Count II and III in the Superseded Indictment.

During pre-trial

proceedings, a conspiracy count, which bore the label Count I, was

dismissed on motion of the United States, and the remaining counts
were re-numbered.)
Counts I and II as re-numbered and modified read as
follows:
COUNT I
A. On or about January 16, 1988, in the
Central Division of the District of Utah,
ADDAM W. SWAPP,
and VICKIE L. SINGER,
did knowingly and maliciously damage and
attempt to damage, by means of an explosive,
a building, to wit:
the Kamas Utah Stake
Center of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints located at 3038 North
Highway 189, Marion, Utah, a building used in
interstate and foreign commerce and in an
activity affecting interstate and foreign
commerce, and did aid and abet therein; all in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(1) and (2).
COUNT II
A. On or about January 16, 1988, in the
Central Division of the District of Utah,
ADDAM W. SWAPP,
and VICKIE L. SINGER
did knowingly use and aid and abet in the use
of a deadly and dangerous weapon and device,
to wit: a bomb, during and in relation to the
crime of violence set forth in Count I above,
which is incorporated herein by reference; all
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (2).
At the time of final argument, the United States Attorney
made the following statement (R-9):
The elements of proof that the government
has to meet and satisfy you beyond a
reasonable doubt about are similar to all
three of these bomb-related offenses. And let
2

me just take them one at a time and run
through the elements for you so that you111
have insight into what the elements of the
offense are when the court later instructs
you.
Count I charged that on or about the
16th of January the defendant used an
explosive, in this case a bomb, to damage the
Kamas Stake Center. Thatfs the first element.
The second element is that the Kamas Stake
Center was a building used in an activity
affecting interstate commerce.
Thatfs the
second element the government must meet. And
third, that the defendant acted maliciously.
The second count has just two elements.
One is that the defendant committed the crime
of violence charged in Count I maliciously
damaging the stake center, and second, that
the defendant knowingly carried or used a bomb
during or in relation to that crime of
violence.
That statement reiterated the theory of prosecution, then
argued and previously presented by the United States at trial.
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys
or attempts to damage or destroy by means of
fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle,
or other real or personal property used in
interstate or foreign commerce or in any
activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than
ten years or fined not more than $10,000 or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides as follows:
Whoever, during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,
including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, which provides for an
enhanced punishment if committed by the use of
a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for
which he may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States, uses or carries a firearm,
shall, in addition to the punishment provided
for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five
3

years, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm
muffler, to imprisonment for ten years* In
the case of his second or subsequent
conviction under this section, such person
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for ten
years, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or
is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm
muffler, to imprisonment for twenty years.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the court shall not place on probation or
suspend the sentence of any person convicted
of a violation of this subsection, nor shall
the term of imprisonment imposed under this
subsection run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment including that imposed
for the crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime, or drug trafficking crime in which the
firearm was used or carried.
No person
sentenced under this subsection shall be
eligible for parole during the term of
imprisonment imposed herein.
At the time sentence was imposed on Count I as to Addam
Swapp, and on Count I as to Vickie Singer, the court in each
instance deferred sentencing each defendant as to Count II, stating
the same would be unlawfully cumulative or duplicative of the
sentence imposed in each instance on Count I.

The court called

attention, as well, to Instructions numbered 33, 42, and 47.
Some

special

interrogatories

and

instructions

presented to the jury as part of a verdict form.

were

(Special Verdict

form and jury responses noted thereon).
The question presented is very narrow.

It is concerned

with Congressional intent.
It

is

concerned,

also,

as

to

how

statutes

as

an

expression of Congressional intention are to be reconciled, if
reconciliation is possible, in their application to the peculiar

4

facts common to Counts I and II.
Although

the

provision

in

18

U.S.C.

§

924(c)

is

frequently referred to as a penalty enhancement provision, it is
in reality a separate offense.
6, 10 (1978).

See:

Simpson v United States, 435 U.S.

H. R. Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 10,

reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 1327, 1336.

It

is well established that a defendant may be convicted of two
separate offenses arising from a single act, so long as each
requires a proof of fact not essential to the other. United States
v. Crew. 538 F.2d 575, 577 (4th Cir. 1976).

In Blockbuster v.

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931), the Supreme Court held that
"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
district statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id.
at 304.
The Court was presented, by way of pleading and proof,
with a transaction which was essentially identical as to Counts I
and II, although the nature of the participation by Addam Swapp,
and Vickie Singer factually varied.
Unlike most situations where 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is
invoked, the transaction proved for Count II is essentially the
same transaction as that proved for Count I.

In short, nothing

factually new is added for Count II.
The penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 844 (i) provides for
a discretionary penalty with no floor, and a ceiling of ten years.

5

The penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) has a mandatory
provision of five years, with a common floor and ceiling*
As to Count I, the court, within limits, is empowered by
Congress to exercise its discretion in fashioning an appropriate
penalty.

Such seems to be the express intention of Congress.

Congress provided a penalty ceiling and no floor, as it relates to
the transaction alleged and proved in Count 1.
The court, when called upon to impose a penalty for what
is essentially the same transaction (Count II), is called upon to
do something which is in derogation of the penalty instruction as
to Count I, and which would modify or nullify the exercise of court
discretion as to Count I.
18

U.S.C.

§

924(c)(1)

punctuated, is ambiguous.

as

written,

published,

and

The problem of finding meaning is

somewhat helped by Congressional history, which provides a basis
for finding that the comma which appears after the words "including
a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime^" ought not to be
there, even though it is there.

H. R. Rep. No. 1030, 98th Cong.,

2nd Sess. 312-315, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3182, 3490-3492.
If one omits the comma, then the statute seems to track
the Congressional history.
overturn some aspects of

It seems to have been passed to
United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6

(1978), and United States v. Busic, 446 U.S. 398, bank robbery and
assault on a federal officer cases, respectively.
But, even granting that, the very narrow question as to
Congressional intent remains, namely, where the pleadings and the

6

proof relating to a primary offense (Count I) are essentially
identical with the pleading and the proof of a second count of
which

the

first

is usually

a

component, but

in

this

case

essentially identical, did Congress intend that a discretionary
punishment imposed for the act complained of in Count I be modified
by a mandatory sentence for essentially the same transaction
pleaded and proved in Count II.
The court is then faced with a paradox, in essence
conflicting Congressional instructions.

The Congressional signal

flashes both red and green. The hexagonal sign says both stop and
go.
Which of the conflicting signals did Congress intend the
court to follow?

How can the court exercise discretion and not

exercise discretion at the same time in providing punishment for
what is essentially the same transaction.
The court resolved the dilemnu., the apparent conflict,
by following the instruction of Congress as to Count I and by
exercising its discretion as to Count I.
Because the pleading and proof as to Count II were
essentially identical to Count I, the court followed a time honored
method of deferring sentencing on what was essentially the same
transaction.
Other courts have been faced with similar situations.
In United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1977), the
defendant was indicted and convicted of four narcotics offenses
arising out of two separate transactions.
7

The district court

imposed on each count a seven year term, as well as a three year
term to run concurrently. The Tenth Circuit noted that Counts III
and IV were based on a single transfer of heroin on June 2nd, and
that Counts I and II were based on a single transfer of heroin
which occurred on May 16th. While it affirmed the convictions, the
case was remanded with directions to vacate one of the concurrent
sentences imposed on Counts I and II, and one of the concurrent
sentences imposed on Counts III and IV. In reaching its decision,
the court referred to Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957),
which holds that Congress did not intend to increase the maximum
sentence when two violations of the same statute are shown by a
single act. It then looked to decisions reached by other circuits
and stated:
We agree with the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits that separate sentences may not be
imposed for offenses arising from th'> same
transaction.
The anomaly of a conviction
going apparently unvindicated does not bar the
correction of sentence. One sentence for each
transaction achieves a just result consistent
with legislative intent. See: United States
v. Stevens, 521 F.2d at 337.
558 F.2d at 1368.
In a similar situation, United States v. Arbelaez, 812
F.2d

530,

(9th

Cir.

1987),

the

Ninth

Circuit

affirmed

the

Defendant's conviction on Count I, conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute, on Count II, aiding and abetting the
distribution of cocaine, and on Count III, aiding and abetting the
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The Court

affirmed his sentence on Count I, but remanded with instructions
to the district court "to vacate and stay the entry of judgment

8

and the imposition of sentence on either Count II or Count III.11
812 F.2d 530, 534.
Olivas and Arbelaez each involve 18 U.S.C. § 841(a(1) where
Congressional intent to impose separate punishments is not in
doubt.

However, in these cases, while under this particular

statute the defendant could be convicted on both counts, the
sentence was vacated.
the

imposition

Furthermore, the rationale behind allowing

of separate punishments was

M

to

give maximum

flexibility to judges, permitting them to tailor the period of
imprisonment, as well as the fine, to the circumstances involved
in the individual case."

United States v. DeJesus. 806 F.2d 31,

36 (2d Cir. 1986), citations omitted.

In another case out of the

9th Circuit, United States v. Wilson. 781 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.
1986), the defendant was tried and convicted of possession of
piperidine with knowledge that it would be used to manufacture PCP,
of manufacturing PCP, and of attempting to manufacture PCP. In the
case, the defendant began, but did not complete, the process of
manufacturing PCP.

The court noted that there was no reason to

hold here, any more than there was in Prince, that Congress
intended multiple punishments for the criminal who completes more
than one step of the crime and held that, while the defendant was
properly charged and tried on separate counts for each step, he
could be convicted and sentenced for only one.

782 F.2d 1438,

1440.
It seemed to this court at the time of sentencing, and
it seems to the court now, that it is unlawfully cumulative that
one should be punished (Count I) for destroying a building through

9

the use of a bomb, and that one should be further punished (Count
II) for destroying the same building through the use of the same
bomb.
It

further

seemed

to

the

court

that

in

imposing

punishment for what is essentially the same transaction that
Congress, if it desired, could well have amended 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
and provided a floor of five years. This it didn't do. Discretion
remained with the court.

By not doing so, it provided the

sentencing court with a dilemma as to what Congress really intended
to do.
The Court deferred as to Count II, vindicating a verdict
as to a redundant count, but withholding sentence on the theory
that Congress could not have intended that one be sentenced twice
for the same unlawful transaction in ways which conflict.
Had the United States Attorney charged in Count II, which
he did not, that in carrying the bomb to the site where it was
used, the defendants carried with them as well some other device
(such as a rifle, for example) other than the material alleged in
Count 1, then the sentencing result could well be different.
Neither the pleadings nor the proof in this instance supply that
needed variation, that additional element, which to the court seems
essential to justify the imposition of additional punishment.
This rationale relates only to Counts I and II.

It has

no relevance to any other application of § 924(c)(1) in this case.
As to certain remaining counts, the court was called upon
to examine the last minute suggestion of the United States that as
to certain counts under § 944(c)(1), a minimum mandatory sentence

10

of 10 years should be imposed under the provision of the statute
which "In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under
this section, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
ten years . . . ."
Up until that moment, the United States had always taken
the position that the appropriate penalty to be applied was five
years, as to certain counts.

Such was contained in the pre-

sentence report, and was relied upon by the parties*

In support

of its new position, the United States cited a case from Georgia,
United States v. Rawlings. 821 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987), found
the night before the sentencing.

The court is of the opinion the

authority is distinguishable and non-persuasive. There is no 10th
Circuit case on the subject.

All of the events in this case were

intimately connected. All were the subject of a common indictment.
All were presented and considered by the jury at the same time.
All were concurrently reported on by the jury.

In the opinion of

the Court none of the § 944(c) (1) counts could be said to be second
or subsequent to the others.

The position of the United States,

originally taken, seems to the court to have been the correct and
appropriate position.
The court sentenced based on that understanding.

There

is an old and venerable rule of construction called the rule of
lenity.

Basically, it admonishes that one resolve questions of

doubt as to Congressional intent in favor of a defendant.

In

short, in the interest of fairness, ambiguities and conflicts
should be resolved with a defendant given the benefit

11

of the doubt. As noted in United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302,
1317 (10th Cir. 1987), "Where the statute and legislative history
are not clear, we are governed by the principle of lenity:

f

[I]f

Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly
and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a
single transaction into multiple offenses. . . . , M

(citations

omitted).
Such practice symbolizes that sentencing means something
more than organized vengeance. Deterrence, individual and social,
and the possibility for repentance and personal change still remain
as values in the sentencing process, even though in the eyes of
some, such optimism as to the nature of a convicted defendant may
seem terribly

old

fashioned.

The values

find

credence and

respectability in history although they seem to have been almost
forgotten in the history of the last decade.
DATED this

^hjn

day of January, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

W^\K^>J^

-^

BRU&E S. JENKINS, chief Judge
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IV

ARGUMENT

I THE COURT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEFERRING SENTENCING OF THE
DEFENDANT ON COUNT II OF THE AMENDED SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE TO IMPERMISSABLY ACCUMULATE
SENTENCES.
Count I of the Amended Superseding Indictment charges that on
January 16, 1988, the defendant did damage by explosive a building
used

in

interstate

commerce

and

did

aid

and

abet

therein

in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(i).
Count II of the Amended Superseding Indictment charges that
on the same date as Count I, the defendant used a bomb in relation
to the commission of Count I which is the bombing of the building.
Appellee Addam Swapp urges that it would be permissible to
violate and be punished under Count I and Count II consecutively
if Count I were violated by the use of something other than the
bomb of Count I.
However, in the case at bar the government charged that the
violation of Count I took place by the use of the very device of
the Count II violation.

The allegations then in Count II are the

same as in Count I because in actual fact the devices were the same
and used for the same event and at the same time.
The government's reliance on United States v. Chalan, 812 F.
1302 (10th Cir. 1987) is misplaced in regards to the operation of
18 U.S.C. 924(c).

1

In Chalan the decision held that the defendant committed only
a

single

crime

of

violence

for

purposes

of

double

jeopardy.

Defendant Chalan was convicted of murder during the commission of
a robbery and the 924(c) charge for the use of a firearm during
that murder and the 924(c) charge of carrying a firearm in the
commission of a robbery, the trial court sentenced consecutively
on the 18 U.S.C.

924(c) counts under

the consecutive

sentence

provisions of the section.
The Chalan decision however holds

that

to run the

924(c)

sections consecutively is contrary to the Blockburger v. U.S., 284
U.S.

299, 52 S. Ct. 180, standard

problems.
proof

of

for Double

Jeopardy

Clause

The Blockburger test is whether one offense requires
fact

decision states

which

the

other

that using

does

that

not.

Indeed,

the

Chalan

test, first degree murder and

robbery would be separate offenses if the murder conviction were
premised on something other than the robbery.

Chalan Supra, at

1316.
Such is the situation with the case at bar.
fact or element differing Count

I and Count

There is no added
II of the Amended

Superseding Indictment.
The

contention

that

any

argument

contrary

to

consecutive

sentences for a substantive offense and 18 U.S.C. 924(c) fails
because Congress has spoken is not responsive to the problem posed
by offenses which are identical in all important respects.

2

The

defendant was not charged or convicted with the use of a rifle in
relation to the bombing of a L.D.S. Stakehouse but was convicted
of the use of a bomb in relation to the use of the same bomb.
The situation is similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
U.S. v. Wilson, 781 F. 1438 (1986).
In Wilson, the defendant was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance with knowledge it would be used to manufacture
PCP, manufacturing PCP and attempting to manufacture PCP.
sentenced

consecutively.

The

same

involved-one criminal undertaking.

manufacturing

of

the

criminal

process

was

The court concluded at Wilson,

p. 1440 that because of the identity
"sameness"

He was

of the substance and the

transaction

that

the

consecutive

sentences should be vacated.
Even

though

those

cases

involve multiple

prosecution

and

sentences for different stages of the same manufacturing process
rather than the application of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) to a substantive
offense, the rationale is the same.

Congress did not intend not

could it have intended to punish the very same act consecutively.
The trial court found that the events, instrumentalities and
parties were identical

in Count

I and Count

II of the Amended

Superseding Indictment except for the nature of the participation
of Addam Swapp and Vicki Singer. (See Memorandum Opinion dated
January 4, 1989 attached hereto.)

3

The Chalan decision Supra at 1317 cites that line of cases
invoking the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant where the
legislature has not spoken without ambiguity in single transaction
issues, (see Bell v. U.S., 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S. Ct. 620)
II DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN INVOKING THE RULE OF LENITY TO
SITUATIONS
CALLING
FOR
CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES
FOR
SINGLE
TRANSACTIONS.
18 U.S.C. 3742 (d) reads:
(d) Consideration,-Upon review of the record, the court of
appeals shall determine whether the sentence(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of sentencing guidelines; or
(3) is outside the range of the applicable
sentencing guideline, and is unreasonable, having
regard for(A) the factors to be considered in
imposing a sentence, as set forth in
chapter 227 of this title; and
(B) the reasons for the imposition of
the particular sentence, as stated by the
district court pursuant to the provisions
of section 3553(c).
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the
opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the
district court unless they are clearly erroneous.
The government, under the Chalan reasoning, could have charged
the damage to a building in Interstate Commerce without the use of
a bomb (malicious destruction) and then successfully enhanced that
violation with an 18 U.S.C. 924(c) violation, but the 18 U.S.C.
844(i) Count of the bombing of the building contained an enhanced
sentence of ten years for the use of the concededly dangerous bomb.
The Chalan Decision concluded at p.1317:
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In Sum, Blockburger dictates that Chalan committed
only a single "crime of violence" for purposes of
double jeopardy.
The appellee/defendant

maintains that

the issue of lenity

exists by virtue of the enhanced penalty for the same criminal
episode as the offense of Count I and the trial judge should be
given discretion to find that a legislative intent exists and to
defer a cumulative sentence.

CONCLUSION
The defendant/cross-appellee contends the trial judge has an
area of discretion in sentencing of defendants convicted of crimes
calling for possible unfair and impermissible cumulative sentences.
The defendant also contends that the reasoning of U.S. v.
Chalan supra, and the cases cited therein are essentially holding
that an enhanced penalty for the same act which was subject to the
enhancement of a substantive charge such as found in 18 U.S.C.
844(i) should not be allowed.

STATEMENT OF COUNSEL REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel

for

the

defendant/cross-appellee

argument to be useful in this proceeding.

John R. Bucher
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believes

oral

